The examples and perspective in this article may not represent a worldwide view of the subject. Please improve this article and discuss the issue on the talk page. (April 2011)
A jury verdict contrary to the letter of the law pertains only to the particular case before it; however, if a pattern of acquittals develops in response to repeated attempts to prosecute a statutory offence, it can have the de facto effect of invalidating the statute. A pattern of jury nullification may indicate public opposition to an unwanted legislative enactment.
The jury system was established because it was felt that a panel of citizens, drawn at random from the community, and serving for too short a time to be corrupted, would be more likely to render a just verdict.
It was feared that a single judge or panel of government officials may be unduly influenced to follow established legal practice, even when that practice had drifted from its origins. However, in most modern Western legal systems, juries are often instructed to serve only as “finders of facts“, whose role it is to determine the veracity of the evidence presented, and the weight accorded to the evidence, but not the application of that evidence to the law. Similarly, juries are routinely cautioned by courts and some attorneys to not allow sympathy for a party or other affected persons to compromise the fair and dispassionate evaluation of evidence during the guilt phase of a trial. These instructions are criticized by advocates of jury nullification. Some commonly cited historical examples of jury nullification involve the refusal of American colonial juries to convict a defendant under English law.
Juries have also refused to convict due to the perceived injustice of a law in general, or the perceived injustice of the way the law is applied in particular cases. There have also been cases where the juries have refused to convict due to their own prejudices such as the race of one of the parties in the case.
Other cases have revealed that some juries simply refuse to render a guilty verdict in the absence of overwhelming direct or scientific evidence to support such a judgment. With this type of jury impaneled for the trial of a case, even substantial and competently presented circumstantial evidence may be discounted or rendered inconsequential during the jury’s deliberation.
Jury nullification is a de facto power of juries. Judges rarely inform juries of their nullification power. The power of jury nullification derives from an inherent quality of most modern common law systems—a general unwillingness to inquire into jurors’ motivations during or after deliberations. A jury’s ability to nullify the law is further supported by two common law precedents: the prohibition on punishing jury members for their verdict, and the prohibition (in some countries) on retrying defendants after an acquittal (see related topics res judicata and double jeopardy).
Jury nullification is the source of much debate. Some maintain that it is an important safeguard of last resort against wrongful imprisonment and government tyranny. Others view it as a violation of the right to a jury trial that undermines the law. Some view it as a violation of the oath sworn to by jurors. In the United States, some view the requirement that jurors take an oath to be unlawful in itself, while still others view the oath’s reference to “deliverance” to require nullification of unjust law: “will well and truly try and a true deliverance make between the United States and the defendant at the bar, and a true verdict render according to the evidence, so help [me] God.” United States v. Green, 556 F.2d 71 (D.C. Cir. 1977).  Some fear that nullification could be used to permit violence against socially unpopular factions. They point to the danger that a jury may choose to convict a defendant who has not broken the letter of the law. However, judges retain the rights both to decide sentences and to disregard juries’ guilty verdicts, acting as a check against malicious juries. Jury nullification may also occur in civil suits, in which the distinction between acquittal and conviction is irrelevant.
Nevertheless, there is little doubt as to the ability of a jury to nullify the law. Today, there are several issues raised by jury nullification.
- First, whether juries can or should be instructed or informed of their power to nullify.
- Second, whether a judge may remove jurors “for cause” when they refuse to apply the law as instructed.
- Third, whether a judge may punish a juror for exercising their power of jury nullification.
- Fourth, whether all legal arguments, except perhaps on motions in limine to exclude evidence, should be made in the presence of the jury.
In some cases in the United States, a stealth juror will attempt to get on a jury in order to nullify the law. Some lawyers use a shadow defense to get information entered into the record that would otherwise be inadmissible hoping that evidence will trigger a jury nullification. A notable contemporary example of this tactic is the claim by the defense in the currently (as of 2011-12) ongoing Roger Clemens perjury trial to have the charges against Clemens dismissed due to “prosecutorial misconduct”, i.e. that the prosecution intentionally introduced video evidence which Judge Reggie Walton had ruled inadmissible, for the purposes of getting, in the words of the defense, “a second bite at the apple”, due to the prosecution’s alleged poor performance. The introduction of the tainted evidence caused a mistrial after only two days. The judge denied the defense’s motion but noted his strong displeasure with the prosecution. , , 
 Common law precedent
The early history of juries supports the recognition of the de facto power of nullification. By the 12th century, common law courts in England began using juries for more than administrative duties. Juries were composed primarily of “laymen” from the local community. They provided a somewhat efficient means of dispute resolution with the benefit of supplying legitimacy.
- No free man shall be captured, and or imprisoned, or disseised of his freehold, and or of his liberties, or of his free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or in any way destroyed, nor will we proceed against him by force or proceed against him by arms, but by the lawful judgment of his peers, and or by the law of the land
- For a trivial offence, a free man shall be fined only in proportion to the degree of his offence, and for a serious offence correspondingly, but not so heavily as to deprive him of his livelihood. In the same way, a merchant shall be spared his merchandise, and a husbandman the implements of his husbandry, if they fall upon the mercy of a royal court. None of these fines shall be imposed except by the assessment on oath of reputable men of the neighbourhood
Largely, the earliest juries returned verdicts in accordance with the judge or the crown. This was achieved either by “packing the jury” or by “writ of attaint“. Juries were packed by hand-selecting or by bribing the jury so as to return the desired verdict. This was a common tactic in cases involving treason or sedition. In addition, the writ of attaint allowed a judge to retry the case in front of a second jury when the judge believed the first jury returned a “false verdict”. If the second jury returned a different verdict, that verdict was imposed and the first jury was imprisoned or fined.
This history, however, is marked by a number of notable exceptions. In 1554, a jury acquitted Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, but was severely punished by the court. Almost a century later in 1649, in the first known attempt to argue for jury nullification, a jury likewise acquitted John Lilburne for his part in inciting a rebellion against the Cromwell regime. The theoretician and politician Eduard Bernstein wrote of Lilburne’s trial:
His contention that the constitution of the Court was contrary to the fundamental laws of the country was unheeded, and his claim that the jury was legally entitled to judge not only as to matters of fact but also as to the application of the law itself, as the Judges represented only ‘Norman intruders’, whom the jury might here ignore in reaching a verdict, was described by an enraged judge as ‘damnable, blasphemous heresy.’ This view was not shared by the jury, which, after three days’ hearing, acquitted Lilburne — who had defended himself as skilfully as any lawyer could have done — to the great horror of the Judges and the chagrin of the majority of the Council of State. The Judges were so astonished at the verdict of the jury that they had to repeat their question before they would believe their ears, but the public which crowded the judgment hall, on the announcement of the verdict, broke out into cheers so loud and long as, according to the unanimous testimony of contemporary reporters, had never before been heard in the Guildhall. The cheering and waving of caps continued for over half an hour, while the Judges sat, turning white and red in turns, and spread thence to the masses in London and the suburbs. At night bonfires were lighted, and even during the following days the event was the occasion of joyful demonstrations.
In 1653 Lilburne was on trial again and asked the jury to acquit him if it found the death penalty “unconscionably severe” in proportion to the crime he committed. The jury found Lilburne “Not guilty of any crime worthy of death”.
By the late 17th century, the court’s ability to punish juries was removed in Bushell’s Case involving a juror on the case against William Penn. Penn and William Mead had been arrested in 1670 for illegally preaching a Quaker sermon and disturbing the peace, but four jurors, led by Edward Bushell refused to find them guilty. Instead of dismissing the jury, the judge sent them back for further deliberations. Despite the judge demanding a guilty verdict, the jury this time unanimously found Penn guilty of preaching but acquitted him on the charge of disturbing the peace and acquitted Mead of all charges. The jury was then subsequently kept for three days without “meat, drink, fire and tobacco” to force them to bring in a guilty verdict and when they failed to do so the judge ended the trial. As punishment the judge ordered the jurors imprisoned until they paid a fine to the court. Four jurors refused to pay the fine and after several months, Edward Bushell sought a writ of habeas corpus. Chief Justice Vaughan, sitting on the Court of Common Pleas, discharged the writ, released them, called the power to punish a jury “absurd”, and forbade judges from punishing jurors for returning a verdict the judge disagreed with.
In 1681, a grand jury refused to indict the Earl of Shaftesbury. Then in 1688, a jury acquitted the Archbishop of Canterbury and six other Anglican bishops of seditious libel. Juries continued, even in non-criminal cases, to act in defiance of the crown. In 1763 and 1765, juries awarded £4,000 and £300 to John Wilkes and John Entick, respectively, in separate suits for trespass against the crown’s messengers. In both cases, messengers were sent by Lord Halifax to seize allegedly libelous papers.
In Scotland jury nullification had the profound effect of introducing (or as others believed, reviving) the verdict of “not guilty“. It was in 1728 that one Carnegie of Finhaven accidentally killed the Scottish Earl of Strathmore. As the defendant had undoubtedly killed the Earl, the law (as it stood) required the jury merely to look at the facts and pass a verdict of “proven” or “not proven” depending on whether they believed the facts proved the defendant had killed the Earl. However, if the jury brought in a “proven” verdict they would in effect cause this innocent man to die. To avert this injustice, the jury decided to assert what it believed to be their “ancient right” to judge the whole case and not just the facts, rendering the verdict of “not guilty” which remains in Scotland to this day. Over time, however, juries have tended to favour the “not guilty” verdict over “not proven” and with this the interpretation has changed. Now the “not guilty” verdict has become the normal verdict when a jury is convinced of innocence and the “not proven” verdict is only used when the jury is not certain of innocence or guilt.
Standard jury trial practice in the United States during the Founding Era and for several decades afterward was to argue all issues of law in the presence of the jury, so that the jury heard the same arguments the bench did in reaching his rulings on motions. This is evidenced by such decisions as the 1839 case Stettinius v. U.S., in which it was held that “The defense can argue law to the jury before the court gives instructions.” Later, judges began to demand the parties submit motions in writing, often before the jury was empaneled, to be argued and decided without the jury being present. This transition began with motions in limine, to exclude evidence, on which it was felt the jury should not hear the argument because they would be informed of the evidence to be excluded. Later that was expanded to include all legal argument, so that today, that earlier practice of arguing law before the jury has been largely forgotten, and judges even declare mistrials or overturn verdicts if legal argument is made to the jury.
 Specific jurisdictions
Although extremely rare, jury nullification does occur in Canada. The power is subject to greater than usual scrutiny, as the prosecution has powers to appeal the resulting acquittal. In addition, judges tend to be very much against nullification; in R. v. Latimer, 2001 SCC 1, it was stated that “The trial did not become unfair simply because the trial judge undermined the jury’s de facto power to nullify. In most if not all cases, jury nullification will not be a valid factor in analyzing trial fairness for the accused. Guarding against jury nullification is a desirable and legitimate exercise for a trial judge; in fact a judge is required to take steps to ensure that the jury will apply the law properly.”
However, a few famous examples of nullification have occurred in Canada. In the 1988 Supreme Court case, R. v. Morgentaler, 1988 SCR 30, a nullification was appealed all the way to the country’s highest court, which struck down the law in question. In obiter dicta, Chief Justice Dickson wrote:
The contrary principle contended for by Mr. Manning, that a jury may be encouraged to ignore a law it does not like, could lead to gross inequities. One accused could be convicted by a jury who supported the existing law, while another person indicted for the same offence could be acquitted by a jury who, with reformist zeal, wished to express disapproval of the same law. Moreover, a jury could decide that although the law pointed to a conviction, the jury would simply refuse to apply the law to an accused for whom it had sympathy. Alternatively, a jury who feels antipathy towards an accused might convict despite a law which points to acquittal. To give a harsh but I think telling example, a jury fueled by the passions of racism could be told that they need not apply the law against murder to a white man who had killed a black man. Such a possibility need only be stated to reveal the potentially frightening implications of Mr. Manning’s assertions. […]
It is no doubt true that juries have a de facto power to disregard the law as stated to the jury by the judge. We cannot enter the jury room. The jury is never called upon to explain the reasons which lie behind a verdict. It may even be true that in some limited circumstances the private decision of a jury to refuse to apply the law will constitute, in the words of a Law Reform Commission of Canada working paper, “the citizen’s ultimate protection against oppressive laws and the oppressive enforcement of the law” (Law Reform Commission of Canada, Working Paper 27, The Jury in Criminal Trials (1980)). But recognizing this reality is a far cry from suggesting that counsel may encourage a jury to ignore a law they do not support or to tell a jury that it has a right to do so.
The Supreme Court more recently issued a decision, R. v. Krieger 2006 SCC 47, which confirmed that juries in Canada have the power to refuse to apply the law when their consciences require that they do so. Within this decision, it is stated that “juries are not entitled as a matter of right to refuse to apply the law — but they do have the power to do so when their consciences permit of no other course.”
In the 1670 “Hay-market case”, William Penn was accused of the crime of ‘preaching Quakerism to an unlawful assembly’ and while he freely admitted his guilt, he challenged the righteousness of such a law. The jury, recognizing that William Penn clearly had been preaching in public, but refusing to find him guilty of speaking to an unlawful assembly, attempted to find Penn guilty of “speaking in Gracechurch-street”. The judge, unsatisfied with this decision, withheld food, water, and toilet facilities from the jurors for three days. The jurors finally decided to return a not guilty verdict overall, and while the decision was accepted, the jurors were fined. One of the jurors appealed this fine, and Chief Justice Sir John Vaughn issued an historically important ruling: that jurors could not be punished for their verdicts. This case is considered a significant milestone in the history of jury nullification.
In a criminal libel case, R. v. Shipley (1784), 4 Dougl. 73, 99 E.R. 774, at p. 824, Lord Mansfield disparaged the practice of jury nullification:
So the jury who usurp the judicature of law, though they happen to be right, are themselves wrong, because they are right by chance only, and have not taken the constitutional way of deciding the question. It is the duty of the Judge, in all cases of general justice, to tell the jury how to do right, though they have it in their power to do wrong, which is a matter entirely between God and their own consciences.
To be free is to live under a government by law […]. Miserable is the condition of individuals, dangerous is the condition of the State, if there is no certain law, or, which is the same thing, no certain administration of law, to protect individuals, or to guard the State.
In opposition to this, what is contended for? — That the law shall be, in every particular cause, what any twelve men, who shall happen to be the jury, shall be inclined to think; liable to no review, and subject to no control, under all the prejudices of the popular cry of the day, and under all the bias of interest in this town, where thousands, more or less, are concerned in the publication of newspapers, paragraphs, and pamphlets. Under such an administration of law, no man could tell, no counsel could advise, whether a paper was or was not punishable.
In 1982, during the Falklands War, the British Royal Navy sank an Argentine Cruiser – the “ARA General Belgrano“. A civil servant (government employee) named Clive Ponting leaked two government documents concerning the sinking of the cruiser to a Member of Parliament (Tam Dalyell) and was subsequently charged with breaching section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911. The judge in the case directed[dubious – discuss] the jury to convict Ponting as he had clearly contravened the Act by leaking official information about the sinking of the Belgrano during the Falklands War. His main defence, that it was in the public interest that this information be made available, was rejected on the grounds that “the public interest is what the government of the day says it is”, but the jury nevertheless acquitted him, much to the consternation of the Government. He had argued that he had acted out of ‘his duty to the interests of the state’; the judge had argued that civil servants owed their duty to the government.
 United StatesMain article: Jury nullification in the United States
In the United States, jury nullification first appeared in the pre-Civil War era when juries sometimes refused to convict for violations of the Fugitive Slave Act. Later, during Prohibition, juries often nullified alcohol control laws, possibly as often as 60% of the time. This resistance may have contributed to the adoption of the Twenty-first amendment repealing the Eighteenth amendment which established Prohibition.
In a well known example of jury nullification, at the end of James Hickok‘s trial for the manslaughter of Davis Tutt in 1865, Judge Sempronius Boyd gave the jury two instructions. He first instructed the jury that a conviction was its only option under the law, he then instructed them that they could apply the unwritten law of the “fair fight” and acquit. Hickok was acquitted, a verdict that was not popular with the public.
 Fugitive Slave Law
“Jury nullification” was practiced in the 1850s to protest the federal Fugitive Slave Act, which was part of the Compromise of 1850. The Act had been passed to mollify the slave owners from the South, who were otherwise threatening to secede from the Union. Across the North, local juries acquitted men accused of violating the law. Secretary of State Daniel Webster was a key supporter of the law as expressed in his famous “Seventh of March” speech. He wanted high profile convictions. The jury nullifications ruined his presidential aspirations and his last-ditch efforts to find a compromise between North and South. Webster led the prosecution when defendants were accused of rescuing Shadrach Minkins in 1851 from Boston officials who intended to return Minkins to his owner; the juries convicted none of the men. Webster tried to enforce a law that was extremely unpopular in the North, and his Whig Party passed over him again when they chose a presidential nominee in 1852.
 21st century
In the 21st century, many discussions of jury nullification center around drug laws that some[who?] consider unjust either in principle or because they are seen to discriminate[verification needed] against certain groups. A jury nullification advocacy group estimates that 3–4% of all jury trials involve nullification, and a recent rise in hung juries is seen by some as being indirect evidence that juries have begun to consider the validity or fairness of the laws themselves.
 Judicial opinion in the U.S.
The 1895 decision in Sparf v. U.S. written by Justice John Marshall Harlan held 5 to 4 that a trial judge has no responsibility to inform the jury of the right to nullify laws. This decision, often cited, has led to a common practice by United States judges to penalize anyone who attempts to present a nullification argument to jurors and to declare a mistrial if such argument has been presented to them. In some states, jurors are likely to be struck from the panel during voir dire if they will not agree to accept as correct the rulings and instructions of the law as provided by the judge.
Recent court rulings have contributed to the prevention of informing juries of their right and duty to nullify. A 1969 Fourth Circuit decision, U.S. v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir.1969), affirmed the right of jury nullification, but also upheld the power of the court to refuse to permit an instruction to the jury to this effect. In 1972, in United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit issued a ruling similar to Moylan that affirmed the de facto power of a jury to nullify the law but upheld the denial of the defense’s chance to instruct the jury about the power to nullify. In 1988, the Sixth Circuit upheld a jury instruction that “There is no such thing as valid jury nullification.” however one of the dissenting judges pointed out that in United States v. Wilson, 629 F. 2d 439 – Court of Appeals, 6th Circuit 1980 that the panel had unanimously decided “In criminal cases, a jury is entitled to acquit the defendant because it has no sympathy for the government’s position.” In 1997, the Second Circuit ruled that jurors can be removed if there is evidence that they intend to nullify the law, under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 23(b). The Supreme Court has not recently confronted the issue of jury nullification. Further, as officers of the court, attorneys have sworn an oath to uphold the law, and are considered by bar associations to be ethically prohibited from directly advocating for jury nullification.
The main deontic issue involved in jury nullification is the tension between democratic self-government and integrity. The argument has been raised that prosecutors are not allowed to seek jury nullification, and therefore defendants should not be allowed to seek it either.
 See also
Wikiquote has a collection of quotations related to: Jury nullification
- Citizens Rule Book
- Fully Informed Jury Association
- Josephine Terranova
- Judgment notwithstanding verdict
- Ultimate fact
- ^ Graves, Dr Frederick D. (2009), “Fact definition”, Jurisdictionary, http://www.jurisdictionary.com/dictionary/F.cfm, retrieved 4 January 2010
- ^ Gaspee Affair
- ^ Trial of the Quaker William Penn (founder of Pennsylvania), 1670 and Trial of Penn and Mead (HTML)
- ^ Clive Ponting and “Troubled history of Official Secrets Act”, 1985
- ^ Kennedy, Randall. “Racial Conduct by Jurors and Judges: The Problem of the Tainted Conviction,” pp. 277-282, and “Black Power in the Jury Box?”, pp. 295-310, Race, Crime and the Law (1997).
- ^ William C. Heffernan, John Kleinig, From Social Justice to Criminal Justice: Poverty and the Administration of Criminal Law, Contributor William C. Heffernan, John Kleinig, (Oxford University Press US, 2000)ISBN 0195129857, 9780195129854, pg.219
- ^ a b Randolph N. Jonakait, The American Jury System (Yale University Press, 2006), pg. 253 ISBN 0300124635, 9780300124637
- ^ Barbara J. Shapiro A Culture of Fact: England, 1550-1720, (Cornell University Press, 2003), pg. 21 ISBN 0801488494, 9780801488498
- ^ “Recognising the Activist Juror”, Deliberations: Law, news and thoughts on juries and jury trials, June 12, 2007, http://jurylaw.typepad.com/deliberations/2007/06/immigration_and.html, retrieved 4 January 2010
- ^ Lars Noah, “Civil Jury Nullification,” Iowa Law Review 86 (2001): 1601
- ^ The Stealth Juror: Reality or Rarity?, American Bar Association, http://www.abanet.org/litigation/mo/premium-lt/articles/trialpractice/0707_gilleland.html
- ^ Hall Jr., John Wesley (2003), Putting on a Jury Nullification Defense and Getting Away with It
- ^ Conrad, Clay (1998), Using Theories and Themes to Acquit the Guilty
- ^ Magna Carta of 1215 – http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/magnacarta.html
- ^ Eduard Bernstein, Sozialismus und Demokratie in der grossen englischen Revolution (1895); trans. H.J.Stenning (1963, NYC) as Cromwell and Communism: Socialism and Democracy in the Great English Revolution, Library of Congress 63-18392.
- ^ Bushell’s Case trial report.
- ^ Simon Stern, “Between Local Knowledge and National Politics: Debating Rationales for Jury Nullification after Bushell’s Case,” Yale Law Journal 111 (2002): 1815-48.
- ^ Stettinius v. United States, Federal Case No. 13,387 (C.Ct. D.C. 1839), 22 Federal Cases 1322, 1333 quoting United States v. Fenwick, Federal Case No. 15,086 (1836).
- ^ http://scc.lexum.org/en/2001/2001scc1/2001scc1.html
- ^ http://scc.lexum.org/en/1988/1988rcs1-30/1988rcs1-30.html
- ^ a b http://scc.lexum.org/en/2006/2006scc47/2006scc47.html
- ^ Abramson, Jeffrey (1994). We, The Jury. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. pp. 68–72. ISBN 0-674-00430-2.
- ^ UMKC.
- ^ Conrad on Jury Duty.
- ^ Legal Culture, Wild Bill Hickok and the Gunslinger Myth University of Texas Tarlton Law Library
- ^ O’Connor, Richard (1959). Wild Bill Hickok pp. 85.
- ^ Gary Collison, “‘This Flagitious Offense’: Daniel Webster and the Shadrach Rescue Cases, 1851-1852,” New England Quarterly Vol. 68, No. 4 (Dec., 1995), pp. 609-625 in JSTOR
- ^ Conrad on Jury Duty.
- ^ Washington Post.
- ^ “…the court can also attempt to prevent such an occurrence of juror nullification by (1) informing prospective jurors at the outset that jurors have no authority to disregard the law and (2) obtaining their assurance that they will not do so if chosen to serve on the jury.” People v. Estrada, 141 Cal.App.4th 408 (July 14, 2006. No. C047785).
- ^ U.S. vs Moylan, 417 F 2d 1002, 1006 (1969)
- ^ U.S. v Dougherty
- ^ http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14731881405627535571&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr
- ^ U.S. v. Thomas No. 95-1337 (2nd Cir. 5-20-97).
- ^ 
- ^ Schopp, Robert F. (1995-1996), Verdicts of Conscience: Nullification and Necessity as Jury Responses to Crimes of Conscience, 69, S. Cal. L. Rev., pp. 2039, http://heinonlinebackup.com/hol-cgi-bin/get_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/scal69§ion=58
- ^ Bissell, John W. (1997-1998), Comments on Jury Nullification, 7, Cornell J. L. and Pub. Pol’y, pp. 51, http://heinonlinebackup.com/hol-cgi-bin/get_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/cjlpp7§ion=9
 External links
Organizations With More Information
- FIJA – The Fully Informed Jury Association – An activist group which encourages educating potential jurors about jury nullification
- JuryBox.org – a website dedicated to informing the public about jury nullification
- Juror’s Handbook – A Citizen’s Guide to Jury Duty by the American Jury Institute
Articles and other works
- “Cromwell and Communism” aka Socialism and Democracy in the Great English Revolution
- Jury Nullification by Doug Linder
- Jury Nullification: Why you should know what it is by Russ Emal
- Essay on the Trial by Jury by Lysander Spooner
- Bushell’s Case – history of Bushell’s Case and jury nullification in its aftermath
- How to Get Out of Jury Duty (Satirical defense of jury powers)
- History of Trial by Jury, William Forsyth. (1875)
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